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COMPULSORY DNA COLLECTION AND A JUVENILE’S BEST
INTERESTS
Kevin Lapp*
INTRODUCTION
The federal government and every state but Hawai’i mandates
DNA collection from juveniles1 as a result of some contact with the
criminal justice system.2 A criminal conviction, an adjudication of
juvenile delinquency, or an arrest can all trigger mandatory DNA
collection. Seized DNA samples are analyzed to produce a DNA
profile that is entered into a searchable database through which law
enforcement matches individuals and crime scene DNA evidence.3 A
main justification for compulsory DNA collection from juveniles has
been the claim that it deters recidivism and promotes rehabilitation.4
The enacting legislation in several states, for example, includes a
finding that DNA databasing is “an important tool in deterring
recidivist acts.”5 Courts have likewise identified “the fact that
*Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I want to thank Lee
Kovarsky, and the Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class for
organizing an excellent symposium and allowing me to participate.
1
Throughout this article, I use “child”, “children, “juvenile”, and “youth”
interchangeably to mean individuals under the age of 18, fully aware that in some
states juvenile court jurisdiction cuts off at 16 or 17, and that psychosocial research
and developmental science indicate that a person’s brain is not fully developed until
the mid–twenties. ELIZABETH SCOTT AND STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE
JUSTICE 44 (2008); Brief for the American Medical Association, et al. as Amici
Curiae, at 13-16, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (noting that frontal cortex not fully
developed until early adulthood).
2
JULIE E. SAMUELS, ET. AL., COLLECTING DNA FROM JUVENILES, iii (2011) (“every
state except Hawaii collects DNA from some category of juveniles . . .”).
3
See Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109
MICH. L. REV. 291, 294–97 (2010).
4
Natalie Ram, Fortuity and Forensic Familial Identification, 63 STAN. L. REV. 751,
790 (2011) (“In upholding statutes compelling database inclusion for convicted
offenders against Fourth Amendment claims, courts have relied on two rationales:
prisoners' diminished expectations of privacy, and states' interests in having accurate
tools of identification and preventing recidivism.”).
5
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 29–4102 (2010) (“The Legislature finds that DNA
data banks are an important tool . . . in deterring and detecting recidivist acts”); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:602 (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-1.5-2 (1998); N.J.
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collection and storage of DNA . . . has a deterrent and rehabilitative
effect” in upholding the constitutionality of compelled DNA collection
from juveniles.6 DNA collection has also been said to “aid,”
“advance” and “further” the deterrent and rehabilitative goals of the
juvenile court,7 and found consistent with the juvenile court’s role as a
“protecting parent.”8 In short, legislatures and courts believe
compulsory DNA collection from juveniles to be in the best interests
of children.
There is little empirical evidence, however, that compulsory
DNA collection deters people from committing crimes or fosters their
rehabilitation. While some researchers have found a small reduction in
recidivism attributable to deterrence for some offense categories,
others insist that no empirical evidence supports the claim that DNA
databases deter crime.9 Whatever specific deterrence DNA databasing
may achieve is certainly diminished with respect to juveniles, who are
less deterrable than adults.10 The paucity of evidence for a deterrent

STAT. ANN. § 53:1-20.28 (1994); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 12-12-1102 (1997); 44 PA.
STAT. ANN. § 2302 (2005).
6
In re Lakisha M., 882 N.E.2d 570, 579 (Ill. 2008) (emphasis added).
7
In re Calvin S., 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 559, 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (the rehabilitative
goal of the juvenile court is “aided by DNA testing of juvenile felons”); Lakisha,
supra note 6, at 579 (DNA collection from juveniles “advances, rather than conflicts
with, the [deterrence and rehabilitative] goals of our Juvenile Court Act.”); In the
Matter of Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juvenile Action Nos. JV–512600 & JV–512797,
930 P.2d 496, 501–02 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (DNA collection “further[s] the
protective and rehabilitative goals of the juvenile court”).
8
Maricopa Cnty., supra note 7, at 501–02.
9
Cf., SHELDON KRIMSKY AND TONIA SIMONCELLI, GENETIC JUSTICE: DNA DATA
BANKS, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 148 (2011) (“currently
there is no empirical evidence to support the often–stated claim that DNA databases
deter crime”); compare with, AVINASH BHATI, QUANTIFYING THE SPECIFIC
DETERRENT EFFECTS OF DNA DATABASES, 57 (2010) (finding 2–3% reductions in
recidivism risk attributable to deterrence for robbery and burglary as a result of DNA
databasing, but increases in recidivism risk attributable to deterrence for other crime
categories).
10
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (“the same characteristics that
render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be less
susceptible to deterrence”); Christopher Slobogin and Mark R. Fondacaro, Juvenile
Justice: The Fourth Option, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1, 44 (2009) (“compared to older
individuals, adolescents are less risk–averse, more prone to give into peer pressure,
less likely to have a stake in life, more present–oriented, less likely to have
perspective, and more likely to rush to judgment. All of these traits tend to produce
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effect in general, together with juveniles’ lesser deterrability,
undermine the best–interest rationale for collecting DNA from
juveniles. Indeed, to the extent that criminal justice contact has a
criminogenic effect on juveniles,11 making it easier to catch young
offenders more quickly and more often (which DNA databasing most
certainly does),12 DNA collection from juveniles could produce
unintended, perverse consequences.
Developmental science has played an important role in
reshaping criminal justice policy toward juveniles in the last decade.
Most notably, the Supreme Court decided a quartet of cases that insist
that age matters in the application of criminal law and constitutional
rights.13 Adolescent brain science and psychosocial research played a
prominent role in those cases, providing an empirical footing for the
idea that children are different from adults and require more protective
rules that account for their immaturity and vulnerability. Consistent
with this jurisprudence, this Article marshals the evidence regarding
juvenile’s lesser deterrability to outline a developmental critique of
DNA collection from juveniles.
But this Article seeks to go a bit further. It argues that the basis
for treating children differently from adults does not reside solely, or
offenders for whom the deterrent force of the criminal law is likely to be, literally, an
afterthought”).
11
Tamar R. Birckhead, Delinquent by Reason of Poverty, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y
53, 97 (2012) (discussing studies finding criminogenic effect of juvenile court
processing); ANTHONY PETROSINO ET AL., FORMAL SYSTEM PROCESSING OF
JUVENILES: EFFECTS ON DELINQUENCY, (Campbell Systematic Reviews, 2010)
(finding in a comprehensive meta–analysis that juvenile system processing appears
not to have a crime control effect but instead appears to increase delinquency across
all measures).
12
See Bhati, supra note 9, at 50 (“offenders who have their DNA recorded in a
database are likely to be rearrested and reconvicted quicker than” those who were
not subject to DNA collection).
13
Roper, 543 U.S. at 551 (unconstitutional to impose capital punishment for crimes
committed by someone under the age of eighteen); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct.
2011, 2012 (2010) (outlawing life without parole sentences for individuals who
committed non–homicide crimes under the age of eighteen); Miller v. Alabama, 132
S.Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012) (mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles
violate the Eighth Amendment). That children are different from adults and require
different rules is not limited to sentencing; See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct.
2394, 2402 (2011) (age is a relevant factor when deciding whether an individual is in
custody for purposes of providing a Miranda warning).
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even predominantly, in science.14 Childhood is more complicated than
that. Its contours are not necessarily set by empirical facts or common
sense.15 In the last two decades, childhood studies scholars have
critically explored the role of childhood in society.16 Writing
predominantly in the fields of sociology, history, and education, these
scholars have shown that in addition to being a natural fact, childhood
is a social construct.17 It is the product of our collective imagination,
reflecting prevailing societal priorities and aspirations.
Like other social constructs, childhood is a category that is
“defined, maintained, and regulated by law.”18 Careful attention to the
conception of childhood can, and should, shape how the criminal law
regulates children. Few legal scholars, however, have critically
explored the implications of childhood as a social construct for the
applicability of legal principles to children.19 Frank Zimring’s path–

14

Annette Ruth Appell, Accommodating Childhood, 19 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER
715, 736 (2013) (“Developmental facts do not dictate the contours or boundaries of
childhood. Ideology does.”); See Emily Buss, What the Law Should (and Should
Not) Learn from Child Development Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13, 13, 34 n.96,
37–48, 49 & n.144 (2009) (arguing that the law should not “assign rights and
responsibilities” in lockstep with “assessments of children’s capacities documented
in the scientific research.”).
15
J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2407 (“officers and judges need no imaginative powers,
knowledge of developmental psychology, training in cognitive science, or expertise
in social and cultural anthropology to account for a child's age. They simply need the
common sense to know that a 7–year–old is not a 13–year–old and neither is an
adult.”).
16
Barrie Thorne, Crafting the Interdisciplinary Field of Childhood Studies, 14
CHILDHOOD 147, 149–50 (2007).
17
Chris Jenks, Introduction: Constituting the Child, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF
CHILDHOOD: ESSENTIAL READINGS 10–12 (Chris Jenks ed., 1982); Annette Ruth
Appell, The Pre–Political Child of Child–Centered Jurisprudence, 46 HOUS. L. REV.
703, 704 (2009) (“childhood . . . is a social construct that is contingent upon time
and place”); Beth Colgan, Constitutional Line Drawing at the Intersection of
Childhood and Crime, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 79, 81 (2013) (the divisions between
juveniles and adults are “social constructions based on public perceptions regarding
the maturity of juveniles to engage in or be responsible for a given action”).
18
DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD 33 (2d ed. 2004); Appell,
supra note 14, at 735.
19
Appell, supra note 14, at 715 (“the legal academy has bestowed scant critical
examination on the category of childhood”); Annette Ruth Appell, The Pre-Political
Child of Child-Centered Jurisprudence, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 703, 726 (2009) (Child–
centered jurisprudence has typically “not taken on, in a systematic way, structural

Lapp

2014]

7/21/2014 2:45 PM

COMPULSORY DNA COLLECTION

57

breaking and critical scholarship on juvenile justice has done so for
years, without the imprimatur of “childhood studies.”20 Currently,
Annette Ruth Appell is leading the way in bringing the insights and
approach of childhood studies to the law, though she has yet to explore
the relationship between the concept of childhood and the criminal law
at any length.21 Further engagement with childhood studies amongst
children’s rights advocates and scholars will deepen our understanding
of the role, and proper shape, of a distinct juvenile justice regime.
This Article seeks to further this important conversation. It
identifies the prevailing conception of childhood (as a separate,
protected space for those whose development must be guarded and
promoted), and explains the role that this conception has in shaping
criminal justice policy regarding juveniles. Simply put, the modern
conception of childhood demands (even more powerfully, perhaps,
than the findings of adolescent brain science) that we not subject
juveniles to compulsory DNA collection for purposes of databasing.
At the very least, the aggregate collection of genetic data from
juveniles cannot be justified as being in their best interests.
The Article focuses on DNA collection following an
adjudication of delinquency because of the resonance between the
conception of childhood and the juvenile court, which was created to
ensure that juveniles were treated separately from and differently than
adults.22 Part I shows how legislatures and courts have embraced an
questions about why and how the law creates and defines childhood, what purposes
this designation serves, and why children are domesticated.”).
20
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE (2005); FRANK ZIMRING,
THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, (1982). See also Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, Youthful Indiscretions: Culture, Class Status, and the Passage to
Adulthood, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 743, 743 (2002) (critically exploring the notion of
childhood behind the regulation of youth crime, describing an American tendency to
differentiate between our own and other people’s children, and excuse the mistakes
of our own offspring while labeling other people’s children as delinquents or
criminals).
21
Appell, supra note 14, at 769–70 (offering preliminary thoughts in a short section
on “youthful offenders”); Appell, supra note 17, at 726.
22
Miriam Van Waters, Youth In Conflict, in THE CHILD, THE CLINIC, AND THE
COURT 217 (1925) (the juvenile court “came into the world to prevent children from
being treated as criminals.”); Franklin E. Zimring, The Punitive Necessity of Waiver,
in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 209–10 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin
E. Zimring eds., 2000) (the policy of juvenile court is to punish offenders without
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empirically unsupportable notion of juveniles’ best interests with
regard to compulsory DNA collection. Part II then introduces the
conception of childhood and the critical role it can and should play in
setting juvenile justice policy.
I. DNA COLLECTION FROM DELINQUENTS
The federal government and 49 states compel DNA collection
from juveniles as a result of contact with the criminal justice system.23
A criminal conviction, an adjudication of juvenile delinquency, or an
arrest can all trigger mandatory DNA collection.24 This Part details the
law on DNA collection following a delinquency adjudication in
juvenile court. It identifies a best–interest justification present in the
animating legislation and case law upholding the practice, grounded in
a belief in DNA collection’s deterrent and rehabilitative effect on
juveniles. It then shows that there is little empirical evidence for such
a claim. The available evidence, in fact, more strongly supports the
contrary idea that DNA collection has no deterrent or rehabilitative
effect on juveniles. It is possible, in fact, that DNA collection
increases recidivism and negatively impacts the life–course of
juveniles.

permanently destroying long–term life chances and developmental opportunities). In
a forthcoming work, I critically analyze DNA collection from juveniles as a
consequence of criminal convictions and arrest, as well as DNA obtained from
juveniles via consent. Kevin Lapp, As Though They Were Not Children: DNA
Collection from Juveniles, 89 Tulane L. Rev. -- (forthcoming 2014).
23
JULIE E. SAMUELS, ET. AL., COLLECTING DNA FROM JUVENILES, iii (2011); 42
U.S.C. § 14135a (2006); 28 C.F.R. § 28.12 (2006) (mandating the collection of DNA
from anyone arrested for or facing federal charges, regardless of the charge).
24
Law enforcement increasingly collects genetic samples via consent–based cheek
swabs, sometimes in exchange for dropping or reducing charges. See Elizabeth N.
Jones and Wallace Wade, 'Spit and Acquit': Legal and Practical Ramifications of the
DA's DNA Gathering Program, ORANGE COUNTY LAWYER MAGAZINE, Vol. 51, No.
9, September 2009 (describing program that provides for the dismissal of felony
drug charges if the individual voluntarily provides law enforcement with a genetic
sample for purposes of DNA profiling); Andria Borba, Police Collect DNA from
Middle–Schoolers in Murder Investigation, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2012,
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/04/police-collect-dna (describing
detectives’ visit to Sacramento County middle–school to obtain DNA from
juveniles, on their consent, in connection with a murder investigation).
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Thirty states and the federal government compel DNA
collection from juveniles based on a finding of juvenile delinquency.
Federal law has the broadest DNA collection scheme. It mandates
DNA collection from anyone (including juveniles) arrested, facing
charges or convicted, regardless of the charge.25 Because federal DNA
collection law does not distinguish between cases handled as a
criminal or delinquent matter,26 and because federal law does not
require a conviction before DNA collection is required, it does not
matter to federal DNA collection whether a juvenile is charged as an
adult and found guilty or charged with delinquency. Either way,
federal law subjects any juvenile charged or convicted in federal court
to compulsory DNA collection.
State laws vary in the scope of their collection from juveniles
following an adjudication of delinquency. Of the thirty states that
collect DNA from juveniles processed in the juvenile justice system,27
twenty–five collect from those juveniles adjudicated delinquent for
legally specified qualifying offenses regardless of the punishment

25

42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A) (2006). Federal law initially prohibited DNA profiles
of arrestees from being placed in CODIS. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a)(1)(C) (2000)
(amended 2006). In 2006, Congress significantly expanded DNA collection
authorization to include arrestees. Adam Walsh Child Safety and Protection Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109–248, § 155, 120 Stat. 587, 611 (2006) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A) (2006)). The Department of Justice issued a final
rule in 2008 that directs federal agencies to collect DNA samples from individuals
(including juveniles) who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted, regardless of the
underlying charge or offense. 28 C.F.R. § 28.12(b) (2011). The final rule was
effective January 9, 2009. 28 C.F.R. § 28.12(c).
26
Contrary to popular assumption, there are federal delinquency matters. The
Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act provides that federal courts can handles cases
involving acts committed by those under 18 provided that the U.S. attorney certifies
to the U.S. District Court that (1) the juvenile court or court of a state does not have
jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction, (2) the state does not have available
programs or services adequate for the needs of the juveniles, or (3) the offense
charged is a felony crime of violence or specified drug offense and there is
substantial federal interest in the case. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2006).
27
Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin.
This excludes states that have “Youthful Offender” laws if the juvenile is processed
exclusively in state criminal court.
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imposed.28 Five states require a qualifying adjudication plus a
qualifying sentence.29 Twenty states collect following an adjudication
for any felony offense,30 with sixteen of those collecting for additional
select misdemeanors.31 Ten collect for select felony adjudications,32
with five of those collecting for additional select misdemeanors.33 All
told, twenty–one states mandate DNA collection from juveniles
adjudicated delinquent for certain misdemeanors.34
DNA Collection Following Adjudication of Delinquency
Misdemeanor
Felony Adjudication
Adjudication
Federal
All felonies
All misdemeanors
Law
20 states = all felonies
21 states for certain
10 states = subset of
State Law
misdemeanors
felonies
DNA collection from juveniles adjudicated delinquent either tracks
collection from adults convicted in criminal court, or is narrower.35
28

Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin.
29
California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Texas.
30
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Virginia.
31
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Washington.
32
KY. REV. STAT. § 17.170 (West 2009); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 25 § 1574 (2012);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 803.225a (West 1997); N.H. REV. STAT ANN. § 651-C:2
(West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:1-20.20 (West 2013); ALA. CODE § 36-18-25
(West 2009); ARK. CODE ANN. §12-12-1006 (West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-6103 (West 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-321 (West 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
973.047 (West 2010).
33
KY. REV. STAT. § 17.170 (West 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 803.225a (West
1997); N.H. REV. STAT ANN. § 651-C:2 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:1–20.20 (West
2013).
34
Most are sexual or violent offenses. See SAMUELS, supra note 23, at 7 Fig. 1 (26
states list sexual offenses as qualifying offense, 13 states list violent offenses, and 6
states list property offenses).
35
For several years, Wisconsin uniquely permitted a DNA collection regime from
juveniles that was, in one regard, broader than DNA collection from adults. The
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For example, Florida makes no distinction in its treatment of adults
and juveniles, requiring DNA collection from “any person, including
juveniles and adults” arrested for, convicted of or found delinquent of
a felony offense.36 California’s DNA collection law treats equally
adults and juveniles convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for any
felony offense, but exempts juveniles from the law’s collection
mandate for those arrested or charged with any felony offense.37
Hawai’i stands alone in completely exempting juveniles from
compulsory DNA collection.38
There is no available data on how many juveniles have been
compelled to provide a genetic sample for purposes of DNA profiling.
A back–of–the–envelope estimate can be made based on a variety of
figures. According to a 2011 Urban Institute report, ten states that
provided data had a total of over 121,000 DNA profiles as of the end
of 2008 that came from individuals who were juveniles at the time of
collection, representing 6.2% of all DNA profiles uploaded by these
states.39 Taking that ratio as a baseline, 6.2% of the current CODIS
DNA profile database would be approximately 800,000 juvenile
profiles.40

Wisconsin statute required a juvenile adjudicated delinquent of fourth–degree sexual
assault to provide a DNA sample even though neither adults nor juveniles waived
into adult court and convicted of the same offense are required to provide a DNA
sample. In re S.M.L., 705 N.W.2d 906, *5 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005) (rejecting an Equal
Protection challenge to the state’s DNA collection law which mandates collection for
juveniles convicted of a certain misdemeanor sex offense but did not compel
collection from adults or juveniles waived into criminal court who were convicted of
the same offense because the “state’s authority to control children is greater than the
scope of its authority over adults”). The law was amended in 2005 to treat juveniles
and adults the same. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.34 (West 2005).
36
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325 (West 2013) (defining “qualifying offender” as “any
person, including juveniles and adults” arrested for, convicted of or found delinquent
of a felony offense in Florida or any similar offense in another jurisdiction).
37
CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 296 (West 2004).
38
HAW. REV. STAT. § 844D–31 (LEXIS 2006) (“Any person, except for any
juvenile, who is convicted of, or pleads guilty or no contest to, any felony offense . .
. shall provide buccal swab samples . . . .”).
39
See SAMUELS, supra note 23, at 17.
40
CODIS-NDIS Statistics, LABOR SERVICES (Jan. 2014), http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics (indicating 10,971,392
offender profiles, 1,892,952 arrestee profiles and 559,705 forensic profiles as of May
2014 in the National DNA Index System).
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An estimate of how many juveniles are subject to compulsory
DNA collection annually can also be made from a variety of data
sources. The number of federal delinquency matters is quite small.
According to one recent study, federal courts handled 152 juveniles in
2008, and 156 juveniles were admitted to federal prison jurisdiction in
2008.41 States, however, are the biggest suppliers of DNA profiles.
Some estimate that 200,000 youth under 18 are charged in criminal
court per year, with approximately 100,000 of those charges resulting
in convictions.42 The number of juveniles processed in juvenile courts
nationwide is much larger. In 2008, courts with juvenile jurisdiction
handled an estimated 1.65 million delinquency cases.43 Even if only
five percent of those juveniles are required to provide a DNA sample,
that would mean over 80,000 juveniles each year. Should DNA
collection from arrestees continue to spread to more states,44 the
potential numbers of juveniles subject to DNA collection would
increase exponentially. In 2012, almost one million arrests of persons
under age 18 were made in the United States.45 All told, as many as
several hundred thousand juveniles could, each year, be required to
provide a genetic sample for purposes of DNA profiling.
Legislatures and courts have identified several rationales for
compelling juveniles adjudicated delinquent to provide a DNA
sample. Among them are the claim that DNA collection and profiling
41

MARK MOTIVANS & HOWARD SNYDER, SUMMARY: TRIBAL YOUTH IN THE
FEDERAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1(U.S. Dep’t of Justice: Bureau of Justice Statistics,
2011). Federal law also compels collection from anyone arrested.
42
THE IMPACT OF PROSECUTING YOUTH IN THE ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM:
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 2 (UCLA School of Law Juvenile Justice Project,
2010) (citing Jennifer L. Woolard et
al., Juveniles within Adult Correctional Settings: Legal Pathways and
Developmental Considerations, 4 INT'L J. OF FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 1, 4
(2005)). David Chura, Prison is No Place to Grow Up: Why Every State Must Enact
Juvenile Justice Reforms, YOUTHtoday. (Oct. 28, 2013),
http://www.youthtoday.org/view_blog.cfm?blog_id=770.
43
JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS: 2008 6 (2011) (noting that juveniles court cases are
up 43% since 1985, though down 12% from the peak of almost 1.9 million in 1997).
44
This is likely following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct.
1 (2012) which upheld the constitutionality of compulsory pre–conviction DNA
collection.
45
Uniform Crime Report, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES Tab. 36 (2012),
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.2012/tables/36tabledatadecoverviewpdf.
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serves the governmental purpose of accurately and efficiently
identifying the person whose genetic material is seized,46 and that it
helps solve crime.47 This Article focuses on the claim that DNA
collection from juveniles adjudicated delinquent is in their best interest
because it deters them from reoffending, thus promoting their
rehabilitation.
The “best interests of the child” standard was born in the
English common law.48 It is “rooted in the concept of parens patriae
and the authority of the state to protect those unable to protect
themselves.”49 Predominant in the child welfare and custody context,
the best interest of the child standard puts concern for the welfare of
the child (her physical, mental, social and moral well–being) at the
center of the government’s intervention in a juvenile’s life.50 The
standard was the centerpiece of the juvenile court, which was created
at the beginning of the twentieth century to handle juvenile matters
separately from adults in a manner that promotes the best interests of
children.51
46

See, e.g., State ex rel. Juvenile Dept. of Multnomah Cnty. v. Orozco, 878 P.2d
432, 435 (Or. 1994) (DNA collected “to record the immutable characteristics of
arrestees and offenders for use in the investigation of future crimes.”).
47
See, e.g., Petitioner F. v. Brown, 306 S.W.3d 80, 89 (Ky. 2010) (DNA database is
“an investigative tool designed to provide law enforcement with additional
information . . . to assist police in solving crimes where the perpetrator left DNA
evidence.”).
48
Julia Halloran McLaughlin, The Fundamental Truth About Best Interests, 54 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 113, 119 (2009) (citing Blissets Case, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 889, 898
(K.B.) (awarding custody to mother because it was “best for the child”).
49
Id. at 125. “Parens patriae” means the role of the state as sovereign and guardian
of persons unable to care for themselves, such as juveniles. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009).
50
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 676 (Melvin M. Biglow ed., 13th ed. 1886) (“Parents are
entrusted with the custody of the persons and then education of their children, yet
this is done upon the natural presumption that the children will be properly taken
care of . . . and that they will be treated with kindness and affection . . . . But
whenever . . . a father . . . acts in a manner injurious to the morals or interests of his
children—in every case, the Court of Chancery will interfere”).
51
See TANENHAUS, The Evolution of Transfer Out of the Juvenile Court, in THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 18 (noting that the
juvenile court was concerned with the social welfare of children, not assignment of
criminal responsibility, and “used the doctrine of parens patriae to argue that
benevolent state treatment of children was in their best interest”).
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The best interest standard is frequently criticized as
indeterminate, easily manipulated and subject to unconscious cultural
biases.52 Critics view it as justifying state intervention and argue that it
is often employed to serve adult interests in the name of child
interests.53 Indeed, the freedom and discretion that the best–interest
standard granted to juvenile court judges explained much of the sorry
shape the juvenile court had taken by the 1960s. Taking its first look
at a juvenile court in the mid–1960s, the Supreme Court described it as
“the worst of both worlds” – offering juveniles “neither the protections
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment
postulated for children.”54
Despite the widespread and long–standing criticism of the best
interest standard, it remains at the center of juvenile court decision–
making.55 As a result, it is no surprise that legislation and case law
regarding compulsory DNA collection from juveniles adjudicated
delinquent in juvenile court frame the practice as being in the best
interests of juveniles. A careful look at just what legislators and judges
52

Robert Mnookin & R. Szwed, The Best Interests Syndrome and the Allocation of
Power in Child Care, in PROVIDING CIVIL JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN 8 (H. Geach & E.
Szwed, eds., 1983) (criticizing the best interest standard as “flawed because what is
‘best for any child . . . is often indeterminate and speculative and requires a highly
individualized choice between alternatives.’”); Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments:
Against the Best Interests of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7 (1987) (calling the
best interest standard indeterminate, unjust, and subject to public policy concerns);
(calling the best interest standard indeterminate, unjust, and subject to public policy
concerns); Pamela Laufer–Ukles, Selective Recognition of Gender Difference in the
Law: Revaluing the Caretaker Role, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 19 (2008) (noting
that best interest considerations are “extremely broad and allow for the expression of
particular judicial prejudice”).
53
Appell supra note 14, at 718–19, (noting “this nation’s long and ongoing history
of substituting state interests for the wishes and interests of children” and explaining
how the best interest standard “enhances state power when it deploys children’s
interests to justify individually targeted and coercive intervention into the lives of
poor and minority children and their families”); ANTHONY PLATT, THE CHILD
SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY xliii, 3 (40th Anniv. Ed. 2009) (aiming to
“destroy the myth that the child–saving movement was successful” and arguing that
the Progressives “helped to create special judicial and correctional institutions for the
labeling, processing and management of ‘troublesome’ youth” that “subjected more
and more juveniles to arbitrary and degrading punishments.”).
54
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
55
See, e.g., N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT LAW § 301.1 (McKinney 1983) (“in any
proceeding under this article, the court shall consider the needs and best interests of
the respondent as well as the need for protection of the community.”).
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mean when they claim that compulsory DNA collection serves
juveniles’ best interests reveals the emptiness, if not the
erroneousness, of the claim.
There are two components to the best interest justification for
collecting DNA from juveniles: deterrence and rehabilitation. The
enacting legislation in several states includes, for example, a finding
that DNA databasing is “an important tool in deterring recidivist
acts.”56 Courts frequently assert the same. The Ninth Circuit recently
declared that the “mere existence of the DNA database creates a strong
deterrent effect.”57 Likewise, the Illinois Supreme Court, without
reference to any empirical evidence, heralded “the fact that collection
and storage of DNA pursuant to our indexing statute has a deterrent
and rehabilitative effect” in upholding compulsory DNA collection
form juveniles adjudicated delinquent.58 The court then concluded that
DNA collection from juveniles “advances, rather than conflicts with,
the [deterrence and rehabilitative] goals of our Juvenile Court Act.”59
A Wisconsin court found that DNA profiling of juveniles “respond[s]
to juvenile offender’s needs for care and treatment, consistent with the
prevention of delinquency.”60 In the most paternalistic decision, an
Arizona appeals court characterized DNA databasing as consistent
with the court’s role as a “protecting parent” because it “works in

56

See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 29–4102 (1997) (“The Legislature finds that DNA
data banks are an important tool . . . in deterring and detecting recidivist acts”); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:602 (1999) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-1.5-1 (2002)
(same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:1-2 (Westlaw 1994) (same); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 12–
12–1102 (1997) (same); 44 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2302 (West 2005) (same).
57
Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1064, reh'g en banc granted 686 F.3d 1121 (9th
Cir. 2012). The First and Third Circuits have likewise declared that the collection of
DNA "indirectly promote[s] the rehabilitation of criminal offenders by deterring
them from committing crimes in the future." United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1,
13 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 176 (3d Cir.
2005)).
58
In re Lakisha M., 822 N.E.2d 570, 581 (Ill. 2008) (emphasis added).
59
Id. at 579; see also In re Calvin S., 58 Cal Rptr. 3d 559, 563 (Cal. App. 2007) (the
rehabilitative goal of the juvenile court is “aided by DNA testing of juvenile
felons”).
60
In re S.M.L., 287 Wis.2d 829, *4 (2005).
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concert” with “the protection, treatment and guidance of children” by
deterring future crime.61
But what precisely do legislators and courts mean when they
say that DNA databasing has a deterrent and rehabilitative effect? And
is there evidence to support such a claim? The supposed rehabilitative
impact of DNA collection can be dealt with quickly. As used by courts
and legislators, rehabilitation does not describe anything separate from
deterrence. Instead, they conflate rehabilitation with deterrence. For
example, in ruling compulsory DNA collection following an
adjudication of delinquency constitutional, the Oregon Supreme Court
declared that “deterrence is an integral part of rehabilitation.”62
Rehabilitation potentially describes something different from
deterrence. Where deterrence operates to influence behavior out of
knowledge of potential consequences,63 rehabilitation has broader
aims. It seeks to help individuals make better choices irrespective of
the punishment consequences of those choices.64 But there is nothing
about DNA collection apart from deterrence that helps juveniles make
better choices. Having their DNA in a government database searchable
nationwide by law enforcement agencies does not help juveniles better
identify right from wrong. Therefore, it does not make sense to
consider rehabilitation as a distinct justification for compulsory DNA
collection. If it rehabilitates juveniles at all, it does so because it deters
unlawful behavior.

61

In the Matter of Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juvenile Action Nos. JV–512600 &
JV–512797, 930 P.2d 496, 501–02 (Ct. App. 1996) (DNA collection “further[s] the
protective and rehabilitative goals of the juvenile court”).
62
State ex rel. Juvenile Dept. of Multnomah Cnty. v. Orozco, 878 P.2d 432, 438 (“if
a convicted felon knows that those ‘leavings’ will reveal his or her identity and is
therefore deterred from committing a crime, the rehabilitative process has begun.”).
63
VALERIE WRIGHT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EVALUATING CERTAINTY
VS. SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT 2 (The Sentencing Project ed., 2010).
64
Francis T. Cullen & Paul Fendreau, Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy,
Practice and Prospects, POLICIES, PROCESS AND DECISIONS OF THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 116 (quoting Declaration of Principles adopted and promulgated
by the Congress in TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS ON PENITENTIARY
AND REFORMATORY DISCIPLINE 541 (E.C. Wines ed., 1871) “the prisoner’s destiny
should be placed, measurably, in his own hands. . . he must be put into
circumstances where he will be able, through his own exertions, to continually better
his own condition.”).
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The deterrence argument for compulsory DNA collection
consists itself of two different notions. First, the DNA database will
make it easier for law enforcement to catch perpetrators whose DNA
is in the database, and thus prevent their ability to commit additional
crimes. This has been described as DNA collection’s probative
effect.65 Courts have noted DNA collection’s probative effect as a
justification for compelling collection following a juvenile court
adjudication. As the Oregon Supreme Court put it, for the juvenile
justice system to succeed, “it must send a message—consistent, loud,
and clear—to the youthful offenders in this state who are bent on
committing serious crimes, that one of the consequences for their
misdeeds is that they will be more readily identified, if they commit
other misdeeds in the future.”66
While no court has ever cited any, there is evidence that DNA
collection makes it easier to catch lawbreakers and to do so more
quickly. According to one study, the probability of reoffending and
being convicted for any offense is 23.4% higher for those with a
profile in the DNA database than those without.67 At least one other
study has found a net probative effect.68 But this is both unsurprising
and primarily an incapacitation argument for reducing crime, not a
deterrence one.69 By definition, those who DNA databasing make it
65

Bhati, supra note 9, at 11 (describing evidence that individuals whose profiles are
in DNA databases who recidivate receive sanctions more quickly and with more
certainty as the probative effect of DNA databasing).
66
Orozco, 878 P.2d at 438 (“If the system can teach these juveniles that there are
consequences to their actions, that they will be held accountable, it will have served
both them and society well.”); see also In re S.M.L., 705 N.W.2d 906, 4 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2005) (“Requiring juveniles adjudged delinquent of fourth–degree sexual
assault to provide a DNA sample is rationally related to two stated goals of the
Juvenile Justice Code.” Protect the public and “respond to juvenile offender’s needs
for care and treatment, consistent with the prevention of delinquency.”).
67
Jennifer L. Doleac, The Effects of DNA Databases on Crime 16 (Dec. 2, 2012)
(Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, Working Paper).
68
Bhati, supra note 9 at 50 (finding probative effects because “offenders who have
their DNA recorded in a database are likely to be rearrested and reconvicted quicker
than” those who were not subject to DNA collection).
69
See In re Lakisha M., 882 N.E.2d 570, 574 (Ill. 2008) (DNA collection can
“increas[e] public safety through either deterrence or removal of criminal offenders
from the streets”) (emphasis added). (quoting People v. Garvin, 847 N.E.2d 82, 92
(Ill. 2006)). Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A
Behavioral Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 175 (2004)
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easier to catch and punish for future crimes are continuing to offend,
so their presence in the database did not deter them from reoffending.
The second deterrent component of DNA collection is that
those in the database, knowing that they are more easily identifiable,
will choose not to commit crimes they otherwise would have
committed had they not been subject to DNA collection.70 This is
DNA collection’s specific deterrent effect.71 For there to be a specific
deterrent effect, those subject to DNA collection should reduce their
incidence of offending once their DNA profile is in the database.
Given DNA collection’s probative value (it increases the chances of
getting caught), it is plausible that those who know they are in the
database would commit fewer crimes. On this aspect of deterrence,
however, the evidence is weak. According to Sheldon Krimsky and
Tonia Simoncelli, scientists and authors of a recent book on DNA
databasing and criminal investigations, “currently there is no empirical
evidence to support the often–stated claim that DNA databases deter
crime.”72
Two recent studies have concluded that there is a specific
deterrent effect. In 2010, Avinash Bhati authored a Justice Policy
Center report that found 2–3% reductions in recidivism risk
attributable to specific deterrence for robbery and burglary resulting
from DNA databasing.73 But Bhati also found increases in recidivism
risk for other categories.74 In a working paper, Jennifer L. Doleac
asserts that the net probative effects of DNA databasing “suggests that
deterrence is playing a role,” but she did not make any specific
specific deterrent calculation.75 Notably, in contrast to Bhati’s
(suggesting that “much, if not most” studies which support a conclusion that doctrine
affects crime rates “is the result of incapacitative rather than deterrent effects.”).
70
Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1064 (9 th Cir. 2012), reh'g granted, 686 F.3d
1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (an individual is “less likely to commit another crime in the
future if he knows that his DNA is catalogued in the State database.”).
71
Bhati, supra note 9, at 11 (specific deterrence means that individuals who would
have re–offended choose not to re–offend to avoid receiving the swifter and more
certain punishment brought about by DNA databasing).
72
Krimsky, supra note 9, at 148.
73
Bhati, supra note 9, at 7.
74
Id. (noting increases in recidivism risk for “violent [crimes], property [crimes,]
and other” crimes).
75
Doleac, supra note 68, at 17. Doleac also added that “effect of DNA profiling
varies with offenders’ age and criminal history”, 16, and it is “unlikely that the effect
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findings, Doleac found that “robbery and burglary rates are not
significantly changed” by larger databases.76 Moreover, that violent
offenders in the DNA database were more likely to return to prison
than similar offenders not in the DNA database suggested to Doleac
that “the higher probability of getting caught outweighs any deterrent
effect of DNA profiling.”77 That is, DNA collection does a better job
of catching those subject to it who reoffend than it does in deterring
those subject to it from reoffending.
There are several reasons why a weak, or absent, specific
deterrent finding makes sense despite the intuitive appeal of the
deterrence claim. One is that the law and economics, rational–actor
foundation of deterrence is more theory than reality. As Paul Robinson
and John Darley put it, having a criminal justice system deters, but the
criminal law—the substantive rules governing the distribution of
criminal liability and punishment—does not materially affect
deterrence.78 Another is that the deterrent effect of DNA databasing is
overwhelmed or irrelevant to particular kinds of offending. Presence in
a DNA database is unlikely to deter crime committed amongst those
who know one another (where there will be no dispute as to the
identity of the alleged assailant) or crime that occurs as a result of
social, situational or chemical influences that overwhelm any cost–
benefit analysis regarding violation rather than compliance.79 Since
these situations cover a significant bulk of crime, DNA collection is
unlikely to show a deterrent effect.80 Additionally, offenders may
know that DNA evidence is not collected at the majority of crime
scenes, and thus do not change their behavior after having their DNA
profile entered into a database. Finally, some have suggested that

[she found] will be linear as governments add more minor offenders (or non–
offenders) to the database.” Id., at 26.
76
Id. at 22.
77
Id. at 1.
78
Robinson & Darley, supra note 70, at 173.
79
Id. at 174 (“even if they know the legal rules and perceive a cost–benefit analysis
that urges compliance, potential offenders commonly cannot or will not bring such
knowledge to bear to guide their conduct in their own interests, such failure
stemming from a variety of social, situational, or chemical influences.”).
80
Krimsky, supra note 9, at 149.
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DNA collection changes the way people offend via forensic avoidance
practices more than it deters criminality.81
It is not just the uncertain evidence that DNA databasing
provides any specific deterrent benefits that undermines the deterrence
rationale for DNA collection from juveniles. Additional damage
comes from the ample evidence that juveniles are, as a rule, less
deterrable than adults.82 As a result, whatever specific deterrent effect
DNA databasing may offer is significantly diminished, if not lost
entirely, with respect to juveniles.
Adolescent brain research and social scientists have
demonstrated three distinguishing characteristics of adolescence that
undermine the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions: risk perception,
peer influence, and future discounting.83 First, juveniles perceive and
assess risk differently than do adults. Juveniles both seek out risky
behavior, including unlawful behavior, and underestimate the riskiness
of unlawful behavior by underestimating the risks of getting caught
and the certainty of punishment.84 Their risk–seeking tendencies and
81

Eric Beauregard & Martin Bouchard, Cleaning Up Your Act: Forensic Awareness
as a Detection Avoidance Strategy, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 1160, 1160 (2010) (finding that
some offenders take forensic precautions to avoid leaving biological evidence).
82
Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Social Welfare and Fairness in Juvenile
Crime Regulation, 71 LA. L. REV. 35, 60 (Fall 2010) (“at a minimum, [current]
research provides no support for the contention that criminal punishment will
effectively reduce recidivism [amongst juveniles]. Indeed, almost all of the rather
sparse empirical evidence points to the conclusion that it does not have this effect);
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS
37–38 (1978) (“Our capacity to nip criminal careers in the bud is either trivial or
nonexistent.”).
83
See, e.g., Scott, supra note 83, at 63 (“due to their psychosocial immaturity, teens
on the street deciding whether to hold up a convenience store may simply be less
capable than adults of considering the sanctions they will face.”); Brief for the
American Psychological Association, et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
at 3–4, Graham v. State of Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621)
(“Juveniles – including older adolescents – are less able to restrain their impulses
and exercise self–control; less capable than adults of considering alternative courses
of action and maturely weighing risks and rewards; and less oriented to the future
and thus less capable of apprehending the consequences of their often–impulsive
actions.”).
84
Scott, supra note 1, 40–43 (adolescents differ from adults in their evaluation of
risk, demonstrating a tendency to seek more novelty and to attach greater value to
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their reduced capacity to perceive risk have obvious implications for
deterrence policies, which are premised on a person’s ability to
properly weigh the benefits of engaging in unlawful behavior against
the expected likelihood of getting caught and the ensuing costs of
punishment.85 As a result, even though DNA databasing increases the
likelihood of getting caught for unlawful behavior, juveniles are
unlikely to rationally include that in their risk assessment calculus.
The second characteristic of adolescence that undermines the
deterrent justification for DNA databasing is juveniles’ greater
discounting of the future. “Generally, adolescents tend to focus more
on short–term consequences and less on the long–term impact of a
decision or behavior.”86 Therefore, even when juveniles recognize
that there is a risk of getting caught and a risk of certain punishment,
they discount that side of the ledger because of its distance from the
now.
A third characteristic of adolescence that diminishes any
specific deterrent effect of DNA databasing is juvenile’s greater
susceptibility to peer influence.87 This susceptibility to peer influence
leads juveniles to “impetuous and ill–considered actions and
decisions,”88 even when they have successfully recognized the risks of
the behavior, and even if they have not discounted the long–term
impacts of their decision. This characteristic of adolescence, too, has
obvious implications for a deterrence justification for DNA collection.
As Frank Zimring recognized, “[i]gnoring the well–known fact of
group involvement causes us to . . . generate inaccurate models of
deterrence.”89 Again, whatever deterrent effect DNA databasing may
the potential rewards that risk–taking provides, especially in group settings);
Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk–taking,
28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 78 (2008).
85
Christopher Slobogin, Mark Fondacaro, & Jennifer Woolard, A Prevention Model
of Juvenile Justice: The Promise of Kansas v. Hendricks for Children, 1999 WIS. L.
REV. 185, 197 (1999) (“Adolescents appear to calculate the risks of getting caught
and punished differently than adults; that is, they do not assess the certainty of
punishment in the same way adults would, or indeed as they themselves would once
they become adults.”).
86
Id.
87
Zimring, supra note 20, at 73–74 (“adolescents commit crimes, as they live their
lives, in groups.”).
88
Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993).
89
Zimring, supra note 20, at 73–74.
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have is overwhelmed in the critical moment when juveniles make the
decision to offend by the combination of their tendency to offend in
groups and their susceptibility to peer influence.
These characteristics of adolescents, individually and
collectively, significantly diminish any deterrent effect of the criminal
law on juveniles.90 As juvenile law experts Christopher Slobogin and
Mark Fondacaro put it, the traits that mark adolescents tend to produce
offenders “for whom the deterrent force of the criminal law is likely to
be, literally, an afterthought.”91
These findings on juvenile deterrability are widely accepted
and have been recognized by courts across the country. In Roper v.
Simmons, the Supreme Court stated that “the same characteristics that
render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles
will be less susceptible to deterrence.”92 It added that “the lesser
deterability of juveniles is not offense or sentence specific; . . .
juveniles are presumably relatively less likely to be deterred by any
specific criminal punishment.”93
Despite the widespread acceptance of the limited deterrability
of juveniles, only a couple of courts have recognized it when
discussing DNA collection. In addressing the constitutionality of DNA
collection from juveniles convicted or adjudicated delinquent, a New
Jersey appellate court acknowledged “the inefficacy of deterrent
measures directed against children who have limited understanding.”94
Nevertheless, the court “conclude[d] that this Act establishes a
90

Slobogin, supra note 86, at 196 (“[T]he literature regarding risk perception and
preference, temporal perspective, the effects of peer influence, and what might be
called ‘stake–in–life’ research . . . [all] suggest that the average adolescent, typically
defined as a youth up to eighteen, differs from the average adult in ways that
diminish willingness to pay attention to criminal law.”).
91
Slobogin, supra note 10, at 44; see Scott & Steinberg, supra note 83, at 56 (“the
research on the general deterrent effect of legal regulation on juvenile crime is sparse
and gives no clear answer to the question of whether . . . punitive measures reduce
juvenile crime”).
92
543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).
93
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN & MARK R. FONDACARO, JUVENILES AT RISK, A PLEA
FOR PREVENTIVE JUSTICE, 47 (2011); See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010);
Miller v. Alabama 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012).
94
A.A. ex rel. B.A. v. Attorney Gen. of New Jersey, 894 A.2d 31, 50 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2006), aff'd, 914 A.2d 260 (N.J. 2007).
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database and databank that further the state's compelling interest in
deterring and detecting recidivist acts of prior offenders, at least when
applied to adult and juvenile offenders over the age of fourteen.”95
There is nothing in the deterrence data on adolescents, however, to
suggest that 14 is an age that matters. To the contrary, the
characteristics of youth that make juveniles less deterrable last until
the early twenties.96
A Texas appellate court was also cautious on the deterrent
effect of DNA databases, though apparently for strategic reasons. In
addressing a claim that DNA collection following an adjudication of
delinquency violated the ex post facto clause,97 the court noted that a
DNA databank may deter recidivism on the part of convicted
persons.98 The court nevertheless clarified that the legislatively stated
purpose of the statute is identification, not deterrence, and stated that
the threat of submitting to a blood draw and DNA databasing “does
not, in itself, seem significant enough to deter possible offenders from
committing sex offenses.”99 By diminishing any deterrent effect of
DNA collection, the court could conclude that the DNA statute was
not criminal in effect and thus reject the ex post facto challenge to it.
Apart from these two instances, no other court has recognized
juveniles’ lesser deterrability in its analysis.
In sum, legislators and courts have defended compulsory DNA
collection from juveniles adjudicated delinquent because doing so
serves a deterrent purpose in line with the purpose of the juvenile
court. There is little evidence, however, that DNA databasing provides
a specific deterrent effect. Moreover, whatever deterrent value it does
95

Id.
Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and
Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31
LAW & INEQ. 263, 286 (2013) (“The human brain does not mature until the early
twenties”); Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and
Impulsivity as Indexed by Behavior and Self–Report: Evidence for a Dual Systems
Model, 44 DEV. PSYCHOL. 1764, 1764 (2008); Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence
Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 815–16 (2003).
97
Appellants complained that the DNA collection statute applicable to them became
effective after the date of their offenses and after they had accepted adjudications
and dispositions in their cases. In re D.L.C. et al., 124 S.W.3d 354, 361–62 (Tex.
App. 2003).
98
Id. at 367.
99
Id. (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.143(a) (2005)).
96
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provides is significantly diminished with regard to juveniles. They
assess risk differently, are more subject to peer influence, and discount
the future more than adults, all of which reduce any deterrent effect
derived from the increased likelihood of getting caught in the future or
suffering punishment created by DNA databasing. As a result,
deterrence (and rehabilitation) fails as a defensible justification for
compulsory DNA collection from juveniles. Therefore, legislators and
courts must abandon this best interest of the child justification for
compulsory DNA collection from juveniles.
II. THE CONCEPT OF CHILDHOOD AND DNA DATABASING
Part I refuted the best–interest justification for compulsory
DNA collection from juveniles, primarily by identifying adolescent
brain science and psychosocial research findings that reject the notion
that DNA databasing will deter juveniles from reoffending and
promote their rehabilitation. Similar arguments from scientific
findings have led in the last decade to the end of other criminal law
practices that treated juveniles the same as adults.100 These cases, and
the scholarly output they have triggered, reflect a renewed emphasis
on the idea that children are different from adults, and that their
differences require expanded protections for children.101 Some,

100

Miller v. Alabama 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012) (finding mandatory life without
parole sentences for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment); J.D.B. v. North
Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2405 (2011) (“Neither officers nor courts can reasonably
evaluate the effect of objective circumstances . . . without accounting for the age of
the child subjected to those circumstances.”); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011,
2034 (2010) (outlawing life without parole sentences for individuals who committed
non-homicide crimes under the age of eighteen); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
578 (2005) (finding capital punishment for crimes committed by someone under the
age of eighteen unconstitutional).
101
See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 29–30; Lawrence Steinberg, Should the
Science of Adolescent Brain Development Inform Public Policy?, 64 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 739, 742 (2009); Marsha L. Levick & Elizabeth-Ann Tierney, The
United States Supreme Court Adopts a Reasonable Juvenile Standard in J.D.B. v.
North Carolina for Purposes of the Miranda Custody Analysis: Can a More
Reasoned Justice System for Juveniles Be Far Behind?, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
501, 504 (2012) (showing that “developmental differences between children and
adults ultimately led to the recognition in J.D.B. that a reasonable juvenile standard
was required” and arguing that “the reasonable juvenile standard has application in
several other areas of the criminal law beyond the Fifth Amendment context . . .”).
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however, have cautioned against making too much of the science.102
As Professor Emily Buss put it, the law should not “assign rights and
responsibilities” in lockstep with “assessments of children’s capacities
documented in the scientific research.”103
The emphasis on developmental research in Part I was not
meant to inextricably link juvenile policy to scientific findings. While
the science is consistent and convincing, the science is not the last or
the loudest word. This Part asserts that the basis for treating children
differently from adults with regards to DNA databasing does not
reside solely, or even predominantly, in science. Instead, drawing on
the work of childhood studies scholars, it argues that a robust rationale
for ending genetic databasing following a juvenile delinquency
adjudication can be found in the constructed category of childhood.
Childhood studies involve the critical exploration of the role of
childhood in society.104 Childhood studies emphasizes that childhood
is both a natural fact and a social construction, and an essential and
permanent component of the social order.105 Every society recognizes
the concept of childhood.106 This is not surprising, since childhood is a
natural fact: children’s bodies and brains are not yet fully
developed.107 Childhood is simultaneously a social construct. That is,
102

Terry A. Maroney, Adolescent Brain Science After Graham v. Florida, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 765, 767 (2011) (“[T]he Graham Court gave [developmental
nuerosicence] the maximum weight it presently can bear” and “temptation to place
even greater weight on [it] should . . . be resisted”); Terry A. Maroney, The False
Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
89, 93 (2009).
103
See Buss, supra note 14, at 13, 34 n.96, 37–48, 49 & n.144.
104
See Thorne, supra note 16, 149–50 (2007) (describing childhood studies).
Drawing on John Rawls’ work in A Theory of Justice, childhood studies scholars
have explained that having a concept of childhood means simply recognizing that
children differ from adults in some way. ARCHARD, supra note 18, at 27. Every
society recognizes the concept of childhood but having a conception of childhood,
on the other hand, “is to have a view of what those interesting differences are.” Id.
105
Chris Jenks, Introduction: Constituting the Child, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF
CHILDHOOD: ESSENTIAL READINGS 10–11 (Chris Jenks ed., 1982); Lourdes Gaitán
Muñoz, La nueva sociología de la infancia: Aportaciones de una mirada distinta
[The New Sociology of Childhood:Contributions from a Different Approach], 43
POLÍTICA Y SOCIEDAD 9, 10 (2006) (Spain).
106
ARCHARD, supra note 18, at 31.
107
Brief for the American Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Graham v. State of Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-
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childhood is a contingent category whose boundaries are not inevitable
or fixed, but are instead defined and maintained by law.108 Societies
can define childhood expansively or restrictively, and use any number
of bases for setting the boundaries.
Not surprisingly, conceptions of childhood have differed over
space and time.109 For centuries, the defining difference between
children and adults lay in physical differences in size and strength.110
John Locke conceived of children as imperfect beings whose
distinguishing characteristic was not their physical immaturity but
their lack of the ability to reason.111 After the rise of industrialization,

7621) (“[R]ecent neuroscience research shows that adolescent brains are not yet fully
developed in regions related to higher–order executive functions such as impulse
control, planning ahead, and risk evaluation.”).
108
Appell, supra note 14, at 735; ARCHARD, supra note 18, at 33 (“[T]he basis upon
which childhood is seen essentially to differ from adulthood may be no more than a
reflection of prevailing social priorities.”). The expressive function of the law then
feeds back the law’s definition of childhood to society, shaping or reinforcing
popular views of childhood. Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1107,
1116 (2012).
109
Jens Qvortrup, Childhood Matters: An Introduction, in CHILDHOOD MATTERS:
SOCIAL THEORY, PRACTICE AND POLITICS 6–7 (Jens Qvortrup et al. eds., 1994)
(noting that the definition of childhood varies over time, space, and culture). Even
within a particular society, childhood can be constructed differently in different
areas. Brief of Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633). In the United States, for
example, maturity can be achieved at age 7 (age of criminal responsibility, can be
prosecuted in criminal court), age 16 (driving), age 18 (voting and serving in the
military), or age 21 (drinking alcohol). Id.
110
Both legend and Congress have it that the age of majority was set as a bright-line
rule at twenty-one by common law courts in the Thirteenth Century because
Englishmen were eligible for knighthood only upon achieving 21 years of age, when
they could be expected to carry a full suit of armor. T.E. James, The Age of Majority,
4 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 22, 26 (1960); S. REP. NO. 92–96, at 5 (1971).
111
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 322, 324 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (“Children . . . are not born in this full state of
Equality, though they are born to it . . . . Age and Reason as they grow up, loosen
[the bonds of dependency] till at length they drop quite off, and leave a Man at his
own free Disposal . . . . The Power, then, that Parents have over their Children,
arises from that Duty which is incumbent on them, to take care of their Off–spring,
during the imperfect state of Childhood.”).
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the modern American conception of childhood as marked by
vulnerability and dependence took hold.112
The modern view of childhood is complicated. Children are
seen as both in need of protection and autonomous beings. Childhood
is understood as both a training period that should not have permanent,
debilitating consequences, and a time when individuals must
understand and face the consequences for their actions. The dominant
conception of childhood in the law, however, is as “a protected space
separated from . . . the broader adult society.”113 It presumes an
“inherent dependency, incapacity, and incompetence of the young and
their need for adult care and protection”114 Children need such
protection because they are “unreliable decisionmakers who are unable
to project into the future, are subject to peer pressure, and possess poor
impulse control.”115 Protective rules thus “aim to shepherd children
into a self–sufficient, democratic, productive, and autonomous
adulthood.”116
This modern conception of children as vulnerable beings in
need of separate, protective rules holds even, or perhaps especially so,
for juveniles who break the law. Indeed, that notion is the bedrock of a
separate, supportive juvenile court. Born during the Progressive Era,
the juvenile court “came into the world to prevent children from being
treated as criminals.”117 It protected juveniles from the criminal

112

Appell, supra note 17, at 749 (“[I]mmaturity and vulnerability . . . [both
physically and psychologically] became the defining social and economic aspects of
childhood.”).
113
Paula S. Fass & Michael Grossberg, Preface, in REINVENTING CHILDHOOD AFTER
WORLD WAR II ix (Paula S. Fass & Michael Grossberg eds., 2012); ARCHARD, supra
note 18, at 37 (“[T]he most important feature of the way in which the modern age
conceives of children is as meriting separation from the world of adults.”). It is “a
time–limited developmental category . . . .” Appell, supra note 17.
114
Michael Grossberg, Liberation and Caretaking: Fighting over Children’s Rights
in Postwar America, in Reinventing Childhood After World War II 19, 29 (Paula S.
Fass & Michael Goldberg eds., 2012).
115
Appell, supra note 17, at 709.
116
Id.; ZIMRING, supra note 20, at 18–19 (“Above almost all else, we seek a legal
policy that preserves the life chances for those who make serious mistakes . . . [and
that gives] young law violators the chance to survive our legal system with their life
opportunities still intact.”).
117
Waters, supra note 22.
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process and its severe punishments and stigma,118 replacing
adversarialness and procedural formality with judicial discretion and
cooperative, individualized treatment that preferred rehabilitation and
training over punishment.119 Moreover, the juvenile court
accomplished its mission with greater confidentiality for the juveniles
involved, and without saddling juveniles with a permanent criminal
record.120
It is not implausible, therefore, that compulsory DNA
collection from juveniles adjudicated delinquent would be consistent
with the best–interest aims of the juvenile court. If DNA collection
helped steer juveniles away from a life of crime and responded to their
need for supportive services, it would arguably serve their best
interests. But as shown above, that conclusion depends on false
notions of juveniles’ deterrability. Moreover, it is based on a view of
children as rational and mature, as not needing protection from, and as
freely and appropriately subject to, the same consequences for
involvement with criminal justice as adults. This conception of
childhood is at odds with the modern conception. And it is at odds
with the Supreme Court’s recent decisions that remind us that children
are children and that they require protective treatment under the
criminal law.
The better conclusion from the prevailing conception of
childhood is that juveniles should not be subject to compulsory DNA
118

Zimring, supra note 22, at 209–10 (stating the policy of juvenile court is to
punish offenders without permanently destroying long-term life chances and
developmental opportunities); Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 Harv. L. Rev.
104, 109 (1909) (“To get away from the notion that the child is to be dealt with as a
criminal; to save it from the brand of criminality, the brand that sticks to it for life; to
take it in hand and instead of first stigmatizing and then reforming it, to protect it
from the stigma,––this is the work which is now being accomplished by . . .” the
juvenile court); DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING 25 (2004);
BEN B. LINDSEY & HARVEY J. O’HIGGINS, THE BEAST 85 (1910) (stating the
criminal prosecution of youth was an “outrage against childhood, against society,
against justice, decency and common sense.”). Not all scholars see the Progressives
in the same light—some use “child savers” more derisively—and argue that
Progressives sought to control children and assimilate immigrant children. PLATT,
supra note 53, at 43–44.
119
Mack, supra note 119, at 118–20 (stating a juvenile brought into the court should
“be made to feel that he is the object of its care and solicitude.”).
120
PLATT, supra note 53, at 137–38.
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collection following an adjudication of delinquency. At least three
reasons support that conclusion. First, juveniles should not be
compelled to provide DNA samples for purposes of databasing
because children, as children, require different treatment from the
criminal law. After more than two decades of increasingly treating
children involved in the criminal justice system like adults,121 the
pendulum has shifted back to special protections for children in the
criminal law.122 This trend, consistent with the modern conception of
childhood as a separate, protected space, reinforces the necessity of
preserving the line between children and adults.123 The very category
of childhood exists as a counter–position to adulthood.124 Children
cannot simply be viewed as miniature adults,125 governed by the same
laws imposing the same consequences for misbehavior, or the notion
of childhood collapses. As Justice Frankfurter put it long ago,
121

Legislatures allowed juvenile courts to mete out ever more punitive sanctions. See
BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE
COURT 246 (1999) (“[S]tates’ juvenile court jurisprudence, sentencing laws, policies,
and practices have become increasingly more punitive”); Kristin Henning, What’s
Wrong with Victims’ Rights in Juvenile Court?: Retributive Versus Rehabilitative
Systems of Justice, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1107, 1113 (2009) (“[C]ontemporary law–and–
order policies make it easier for prosecutors to transfer juveniles to adult court,
create presumptions for detaining youth pending trial, impose mandatory minimum
sentences for juveniles, lift the protective veil of confidentiality in juvenile
proceedings, and require juveniles to register in sex–offender databases.”).
Legislatures made it easier to avoid the jurisdiction of juvenile court and process and
punish juveniles in criminal court. See Robert O. Dawson, Judicial Waiver in Theory
and Practice, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF
ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 45, 52 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E.
Zimring eds., 2000). And the Supreme Court refused to extend or recognize special
protections for youth. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 667 (2004)
(rejecting the argument that failure to consider a juvenile suspect’s age in
determining custody for Miranda purposes clearly violated federal law); see also
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 255, 281 (1984) (upholding pretrial detention of an
accused juvenile delinquent based on finding that there was “serious risk” that
juvenile “may before the return date commit an act which if committed by an adult
would constitute a crime”).
122
See supra note 101.
123
Scott & Steinberg, supra note 84, at 80 (“[R]egulation grounded in scientific
knowledge of adolescence is more likely to prevent juvenile crime and reduce its
social cost than an approach that ignores differences between juveniles and adults”).
124
Appell, supra note 14, at 720 (“Treating children the same as adults . . .
challenge[s] both adulthood and childhood . . . .”).
125
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2404 (2011) (citing Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982)).

Lapp

80

7/21/2014 2:45 PM

U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS

[VOL. 14:1

“[c]hildren have a very special place in life which law should reflect.
Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to
fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination of a
State’s duty towards children.”126 It should, therefore, make us pause
when the genetic databanking consequences of a juvenile court
adjudication are the same as that of a criminal conviction.
The second reason that the modern conception of childhood
rejects DNA databasing of juvenile delinquents is that databasing
conflicts with a separate, protective regime for juveniles. Treating
juveniles who authorities have decided to process in juvenile court just
like adult criminals is particularly discordant with the modern
conception of childhood, and the juvenile court, as a separate,
protected space.127 The decision by the government to proceed in
juvenile court instead of adult court is a decision that matters. It
reflects a conclusion that the alleged behavior does not warrant the
serious consequences or permanent record that come with a criminal
conviction. Instead, by proceeding in juvenile court, the government
has chosen to intervene and impose appropriate sanctions while also
helping the juvenile avoid further entanglement with the criminal
justice system. Making a juvenile court adjudication a trigger for DNA
databasing is a punitive, crime–control scheme.128 That most juveniles
age out of crime, and do not recidivate,129 further underscores the
inappropriateness of genetic databasing as a consequence of a juvenile
adjudication.

126

May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Waters, supra note 22.
128
State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t. of Multnomah Cnty. v. Orozco, 878 P.2d 432, 438
(Or. Ct. App. 1994) (“If the juvenile justice system is ever to succeed, it must send a
message—consistent, loud, and clear—to the youthful offenders in this state who are
bent on committing serious crimes, that one of the consequences for their misdeeds
is that they will be more readily identified, if they commit other misdeeds in the
future. If the system can teach these juveniles that there are consequences to their
actions, that they will be held accountable, it will have served both them and society
well.”).
129 Many estimate that only about five percent of adolescent offenders
persist in criminal behavior into adulthood. See, e.g., SCOTT & STEINBERG,
supra note 1, at 53. Terrie Moffitt, Life Course Persistent versus AdolescentLimited Antisocial Behavior in DANTE CICCHETTI AND DONALD COHEN,
EDS. DEVELOPMENT PSYCHOPATHOLOGY VOL. 3 2nd ed.(2006).
127
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The third reason to end DNA databasing following a
delinquency adjudication is that rather than rehabilitating or deterring
juveniles, DNA databasing actually risks making things worse for
juveniles. As childhood studies scholar David Archard noted,
“[c]hildren suffer specific (and often greater) harms as children and, .
. . are more likely to suffer them because they are children.”130
Childhood scholar Annette Ruth Appell similarly remarked that
“[u]nlike other subordinated groups, children will outgrow their
subordination as children; but whether they will be subordinated as
adults depends very much on their childhood.”131
Recall that Jennifer Doleac found that DNA profiling has a
particularly large net probative effect for young offenders (that is, it
makes it easier to catch them more frequently and more quickly)132
While this might initially support DNA profiling of juveniles—
offending peaks in late adolescence,133 making DNA collection from
juveniles a plausible priority—there is a darker side to it at odds with
the subject juvenile’s best interests. Research has demonstrated that
involvement in the juvenile justice system “is associated with an
increased likelihood of offending behavior.”134 This has led some to
conclude that “contact with the youth justice system is inherently
criminogenic.”135
To the extent that this is true, DNA collection from juveniles
may achieve the opposite of its goals. By placing subject juveniles in
the pool of the usual suspects, DNA databasing increases the
likelihood of their detection and punishment, which itself may
increase recidivism. As one researcher observed, “catching [young
130

ARCHARD, supra note 18, at 61.
Appell, supra note 20, at 706.
132
Doleac, supra note 68, at 25.
133
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN & MARK R. FONDACARO, JUVENILES AT RISK: A PLEA
FOR PREVENTIVE JUSTICE ix (2011) (stating people under 18 commit between 15–
20% of all crime in the U.S.).
134
Lesley McAra & Susan McVie, Youth Justice? The Impact of System Contact on
Patterns of Desistance from Offending, 4 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 315, 318 (2007);
Holly A. Wilson & Robert D. Hoge, The Effect of Youth Diversion Programs on
Recidivism: A Meta-Analytic Review, 40 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 497, 514 (2013)
(collecting studies).
135
Lesley McAra & Susan McVie, Youth Justice? The Impact of System Contact on
Patterns of Desistance from Offending, 4 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 315, 318 (2007).
131
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offenders] more quickly and more often when they commit new
crimes could produce a cohort of more hardened criminals.”136 This is
hardly in the juvenile’s, or anyone’s, best interests.
III. CONCLUSION
For more than a century, juvenile courts have provided
juveniles specialized treatment in a separate forum motivated by the
desire to promote juveniles’ best interests. Legislatures and courts
have declared that seizing juveniles’ genetic material and databasing it
after an adjudication of delinquency serves juveniles’ best interests
because it deters them from future crime and promotes their
rehabilitation. But there is little evidence to support such a claim, and
good reason to doubt it.
It is not just scientific findings that undermine the claim that
DNA databasing is in the best interests of a juvenile who has been
adjudicated delinquent. The concept of childhood itself, and its
purpose and meaning in modern society, further undermine a regime
that imposes the same permanent consequences for juveniles as it does
for adults convicted in criminal court. Indeed, the prevailing
conception of childhood (as a protected space for those whose
development must be guarded and promoted because of their
vulnerabilities) demands that we not subject juveniles to compulsory
DNA collection for purposes of databasing based on a finding of
juvenile delinquency.
Understanding childhood as a social construct makes it
possible, and coherent, to untether the rules for children from scientific
facts. Protective rules governing children can be justified not because
the science supports it, but based on what we want the experience,
purpose and meaning of childhood to be.137 When the science and the
136

Doleac, supra note 68, at 26 (noting that when young offenders “have little (non–
criminal) human capital in the form of education, employment experience, or ties to
friends and family to rely on when they are released”).
137
Appell, supra note 14, at 740 (“[T]he existence of a legal category for children as
well as its boundaries and the rights of and duties owed to children are not nature’s
law, but ‘political choices’ . . . . [T]he category of childhood is comprised of a set of
value judgments and decisions about human beings between birth and eighteen; and
about what it means to be a child and what it means to be an adult . . . .”). The
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concept agree, as they do here, laws that impose a different result beg
careful assessment.

expressive function of the law then feeds back the law’s definition of childhood to
society, shaping or reinforcing popular views of childhood. Todres, supra note 109.

